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Existem poucas evidências da influência de amplos Governos na Felicidade e, quando existem, 
são positivas. No presente trabalho mostramos que os Gastos Governamentais Estruturais, 
assim como outras medidas representativas dos desequilíbrios governamentais, diminuem 
significativamente a Felicidade e a Satisfação de Vida nos países europeus. Estas evidências 
devem ser tomadas em linha de conta e conduzir os políticos europeus a diminuírem os seus 
gastos governamentais e défices, por forma a melhorar a satisfação dos seus eleitores e, 
eventualmente, conduzir à sua vitória nas eleições. Este resultado é consistente com a 
valoração (negativa) das expectativas por futuros aumentos de impostos, instabilidade 





















There is little evidence of the influence of large governments in happiness and when it exists, 
it is positive. We show that structural government expenditures and other measures of 
government imbalances significantly decrease happiness and life satisfaction in European 
countries. This evidence should lead European politicians to decrease government 
expenditures and deficits in order to improve satisfaction of their electors and eventually to 
win elections. This result is consistent with people valuing (negatively) expectations for 
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In this research, we present for the first time estimations of the effects of structural 
government expenditures and related variables in happiness and life satisfaction. To this end, 
we used the European Quality of Life Surveys (waves 2003 and 2007) to collect individual 
microdata for socio economic indicators, and also for life satisfaction, and happiness. We 
completed the dataset with measures of structural government expenditures (% of GDP), past 
years in deficits, structural deficits (% of GDP), and government debt (% of GDP). We aim to 
provide evidence on whether large governments decrease happiness or not and thus confirm 
or not the negative effect government shares have in growth.  
This should enlighten politicians concerning their usual desire of increase government size in 
order to appraise electors. In fact, as we may conclude below previous contributions have 
highlighted positive effects of deficits, government expenditures or at least of some types of 
expenditure (such as on welfare state). The corollary of these results would be then that 
there is a justification to larger governments on the happiness of people (although the 
literature pointed out no justification concerning the negative relationship between 
government size and growth. We re-address this issue and we show that larger governments 
decrease happiness.  
These results re-launch the debate about the relationship between the size of the 
government and happiness and seem to cast doubts on the reasoning according to which 
larger governments and welfare state may be justifiable through its relationship with 
happiness. 
This work has the following structure: in Chapter 2 we make the Literature´s revision and it´s 
state of the art; in Chapter 3 we describe the data and methods used; the empirical results 





State of the Art 
Right after the Second World War, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) became the major index 
used to represent every nation´s development as a whole (mostly in wealth), despite it 
doesn´t fulfill some non-quantitative issues. To illustrate that strong assumption, Daniel Bell 
(Bell, 1972) said that “Economic growth has become the secular religion of advancing 
industrial societies.” 
Nowadays, many articles figured out one non-linear and non-quantitative framework that can, 
eventually, answer some questions that stays out of the framework of GDP: the Economics of 
Happiness. Indeed, the Happiness is wining so much importance on development field, that it 
should be probably a reference (in the close future) for any country indicator´s group. The 
closest example comes from Bhutan1, where was adopted the GNH – Gross National 
Happiness, as the major indicator to measure the development and growth of the country. 
That standard supports the promotion of a fair and sustainable development and growth of 
countries, in real benefit to its population and environment: the so called change of economic 
thinking. 
This current comes from many recent discussions supporting the idea that the present and 
main indicator to measure a country’s progress, development and wealth – GDP, isn´t, itself, 
able to explain the well-being of people, besides the country´s economic wealth. As said 
Jigme Singye Wangchuck, king of Bhutan, “Gross National Happiness is more important than 
Gross National Product”. 
In Friedman (2005), there is a claim of the moral hazards of growth, alerting that not always 
growth is compatible with an improvement of crucial life conditions of population, although it 
brings some material improvements, indeed. He figures the importance of Governments and 
their choices, because growth, by itself, doesn´t guarantee, for example, social fairness, 
efficiency in resource’s usage, the development of population´s well-being, the 
environment´s improvement and protection, besides other ones. As Stiglitz points (Stiglitz, 
2005), the Governments have the duty of make decisions with moral sense: choosing tax´s 
increase or decrease, choosing for the liberalization of stock markets, investments in I&D and 
education.  
That point lead us to a first and important one: wrong government policies and decisions tend 
to make wrong models of economic growth, if not recessions, where governments must deal 
                                                 
1
 For example, see Helliwell et al. (2012) 
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with moral problems and poverty, not just in wealth, but too in liberty, tolerance and 
democracy. Going into the subjective wellbeing (SWB) framework, we can include there, too, 
happiness and life-satisfaction of all the population. 
In fact, as we can see, there is a theoretical possibly that Government´s actuation and policy 
making can affect the subjective well-being of population, described as happiness and life-
satisfaction. That´s the claim we are doing in our investigation.   
2.1. The elapsed field of Economics: Happiness 
Historically, happiness entered into the Economic thinking, practically since it genesis. 
Indeed, the first economists, like Thomas Malthus for an instant, referred the importance of 
Happiness in a country´s economy. By this fact, classic economists took happiness as 
settled, and since them, economists left its study for other fields, mostly psychology 
(Castriota, 2006). 
However, as noticed by MacKerron (2012), since the late nineties of the XXth century, the 
number of articles dealing with happiness has grown exponentially. Clearly, Economists are 
taking again that forgotten field, into the economic wings.  
The goal of that field of economics, as noticed MacKerron (2012), is trying to converge 
Preference Satisfaction´s Theory from the classical economists, to Subjective Wellbeing 
(SWB), sharing from both some rejections of external criteria or judgments.  
As usual in many other research areas, there is some criticism to happiness data – SWB. 
Citing  Clark, Frijters, & Shields (2008), items like Epistemology, Practical and Disciplinary 
are the core of most critiques. Although it, as the same authors argues, happiness’s works 
show large and strong factors to be a strong predictor of future behavior (MacKerron, 2012).  
Meanwhile, as we can see in Johns & Ormerod (2008) and Turton (2009), the fact that 
happiness´s data coming from surveys, (which doesn´t represent the happiness of all 
population) and the “scientific validity of happiness research, most specifically any findings 
based on time series”, are a source of some skepticism for them. Turton (2009) goes beyond 
that, and argue that “policy-makers should not base their decisions wholly on happiness 
studies”: rather, he agrees that politicians must be informed of some happiness indicators 
and potential effects on it, before their decisions. 
Besides this, as Frey & Stutzer (2005) argues, “measures of subjective well-being can thus 
serve as proxies for ‘utility’”. Although not the same, happiness and economic utility are 
“closely related”. As they observed, happiness allows the empirical studies of issues that 
before were only treated in a theoretical and abstract way, such personal behavior, which 
“enrich field research”.  
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Moreover, as we can see in Castriota (2006), citing the work of Alesina, Di Tella, & 
MacCulloch (2004), there are three strong arguments that supports the validity of happiness 
data and allow it´s usage by economists: “(i) psychology use them; happiness studies 
survived a ‘cultural Darwinian selection’ in psychology and sociology; (ii) well-being data 
pass ‘ validation exercises’”, (such correlations between suicide and “physical reactions”; 
“(iii) self-reported life-satisfaction is highly correlated with country indicators of quality 
of life and social capital” (citing Frey & Stutzer (2002a)). 
There are also important implications, mainly in the Economic Policy. Frey & Stutzer 
(2002a) supports the idea that the study of happiness into the economics field allows (with 
its evaluations and measures) a new and important vision to politic makers, as featuring and 
allowing a “new way of evaluating the effects of government expenditures”, which increase 
the importance of Public Choice Theory. Citing Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & 
Stone (2004), “The goal of public policy is not to maximize measured GDP, so a better 
measure of well-being could help to inform policy.” 
As Bjørnskov, Dreher, & Fischer (2006) debates, there is two visions for Governments’ 
actuation: besides the Public Choice view, were “Government Consumption, in general, 
reduces life satisfaction”; and besides the Neoclassical Economic Theory, “which predicts 
that governments play an unambiguously positive role for individuals´ quality of life”.  
A clear point is that Happiness´s analyses (SWB) are having more importance. Many reports 
define it, as a possible complement or even alternative to GDP (see, for example, Diener & 
Seligman (2004), Kahneman et al. (2004), Di Tella & MacCulloch (2008), Helliwell, Layard, & 
Sachs (2012)). As Clark et al. (2008), citing Oswald (1997), “the radical implication for 
developed countries at least is that economic growth per se is of little importance, and 
should therefore not be the primary goal of economic policy”. As Frey & Stutzer (2002b) 
puts it, the main economic activities, supplying goods and services, only have true value if it 
contributes to human happiness.  
2.2. Major correlated factors 
Despite the large number of articles dealing with the sphere of happiness, most have 
concentrated on the relationship between income and happiness, finding that while richer 
countries tend to have, on average, higher levels of happiness, continuous increases in 
income cannot be associated with happier populations. This phenomenon has been named 
the Easterly paradox – (Easterlin (1974))2.  
                                                 
2 In his work, Easterlin found that in United States, between 1973 and 2004, despite GDP per capita 
shown an increase for the double, it doesn´t shown any trend in citizen´s happiness reported on 
General Social Survey. 
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That work of Easterlin, as referenced in MacKerron (2012), “is often cited as an early 
(re)introduction of SWB into economics”.3  
Moreover, as Greve (2012) said, citing the work of Easterlin & Angelescu (2009), “in the short 
run there is a positive relation between income and happiness, but ‘over the long term, 
happiness and income are unrelated’”.  
In Greve (2012), who cited the work of Oswald (1997), we can see that happiness can´t be 
considered an “absolute phenomenon”, in way that people can compare their life with 
others, and by that fact, happiness reported depends from the way that people see and 
compare. 
Another interesting fact is the adaptation issue: as Deaton (2011) explain, one person who 
lives in misery, can report a high level of happiness, because is used to it. For that, the 
author argues that “we should not base policy on a measure that is subject to hedonic 
adaptation”. Kahneman et al. (2004) argues that “findings of adaptation are robust, but 
open to multiple interpretations”: revealing the work of Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-
Bulman (1978) they show that “after a period of adjustment lottery winners were not much 
happier than a control group, and paraplegics were not much unhappier.” 
In addition, as described by Deaton (2011), who cited Cartensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 
(1999), there is a theory that explains the biggest happiness between old people instead of 
young people reported in some works: Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Cartensen et al., 
1999). That theory argues that older people are more prepared to deal with negative 
circumstances and experiences, which “perhaps offset the increase in physical pain and 
may help account for the increase in overall well-being with age in spite of deteriorating 
health”. 
Relatively to education, many studies identify it as a strong and positive contribute to SWB. 
As we can realize in Castriota (2006) education contributes directly (“self-confidence and 
self- estimation, pleasure from acquiring knowledge”) and indirectly (“higher employment 
probability, better job quality, higher expected salary and better health”) to SWB.  
There are also important correlations between SWB and other personal variables, such 
marriage, number of children, gender, besides other ones.4  
Evidence on income inequality is mixed; its effect may depend partially on real or perceived 
mobility. Some articles have analyzed the impact of crises in happiness: while (Greve, 2012) 
did not find any association between the economic crises of 2010 in European countries and 
                                                 
3
 For recent attempts to solve the Easterly paradox see e.g. Clark et al., 2007; (Bartolini & Bilancini, 
2010); Choudhary et al., 2011). 
4
 See, for example, (Frey & Stutzer, 2002b), and (Zimmermann & Easterlin, 2006). 
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happiness, Deaton (2011) found a strong correlation between well-being and stock market 
indexes in USA. Furthermore, Becchetti & Marini (2012) found for Germany and Italy a 
negative correlation between “happiness and (fear of) financial crises”.  
In a recent work, using the World Values Surveys for 2009, Nugent & Switek (2013) found a 
strong negative correlation among people´s life satisfaction living in an oil importer´ country, 
and a strong positive correlation to people living in an oil exporter´ country. 
The effect of macroeconomic variables on happiness has been subject also to some research. 
As MacKerron (2012) puts it, high unemployment rates may reduce WB, although research is 
limited, (but high local unemployment rates may also ameliorate the impact of an individual’s 
own unemployment); inflation may also have a negative influence on wellbeing, especially for 
those who favors with right wing politics.  
2.3. The role of Government 
The connection between the role of the Government and happiness has been, in some 
degree, a neglected subject in the literature. There are some studies that address the 
effects of social insurance and the welfare state (MacKerron (2012)). Di Tella & MacCulloch 
(2008) identified positive effects of the welfare state on happiness for OECD countries. 
Some evidence of the effect of social security measures is also provided by Uhde (2010) in 
which the fall in social security expenditures may explain the decrease in life satisfaction in 
Germany since 2001, despite of having increased material prosperity.  
The effects of governments in happiness have also been analyzed using political variables 
such as democracy, with a positive effect (MacKerron (2012)) and also bureaucratic 
accountability and transparency, which has contributed to reduce the well-being disparities 
in US states (Luechinger, Schelker, & Stutzer (2013)). Moreover, Frey & Stutzer (2000) found 
a strong and positive influence of institutional factors, such individuals´ direct political 
participation, in the SWB of people. 
The effects of government expenditures, deficits, and of austerity measures in happiness 
and well-being were only sparsely analyzed until now, as recognized by Kim and Kim (2012). 
For instance, Di Tella & MacCulloch (2008) presented a statistically significant and positive 
effect of unemployment benefits in happiness, a specific item of government expenditure. 
In fact, in the working paper version of that article the authors presented regressions (Table 
1A) in which government consumption has a significantly positive effect in happiness.  
In a master thesis, Jimenez (2011) evaluated the effects of government size in happiness 
but she has done that in regressions in which all data are aggregate, which is a clearly 
inferior option when compared to studies that use microdata for individual features.  
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Yamamura (2011) – for Japan, Kiyia (2012) – for the USA and Akay et. al. (2012) – for 
Germany -, presented evidence of a positive or at least non-significant effect of government 
size on happiness, using expenditures size and composition in the first two and taxes on the 
third, respectively, as measures of government size. Hessami (2010) access the effect of 
size and composition of government expenditures on life satisfaction. This article found 
positive effect of government size on life satisfaction. This positive effect seems to 
decrease with the size of the government (the so-called inverted U-shaped relationship), 
with relative income, ideological preferences, and corruption and seems to increase with 
expenditures decentralization. Whether these last effects seem to be quantitatively 
meaningful, the argued negative effect of government size (the right-side of the inverted U) 
does not have practical significance as globally it would occur only after the government 
expenditure (as % of GDP) would be higher than nearly 110%, which is in fact out of the 
observed values by the author (see e.g. their Figure 2).  
In Bjørnskov et al. (2006) we can observe some evidences of the correlation between 
Government Size and Life Satisfaction over several countries of world. Using some 
representative variables to represent the actuation of the governments, the remarkable 
findings were: i) positive and highly statistical significance with variables such social trust, 
openness and investment price; ii) negative and highly statistical significance with the 
variable government consumption. They show, too, strong evidences that excessive 
government’ expenditures are prejudicial to people´s satisfaction with life, and that fact is 
only reduced if in presence of a truly government´s effectiveness. Moreover, they didn´t 
found any significant impact of capital formation or social spending on life satisfaction. That 
findings supports, as the same authors argues, the Public Choice view. Furthermore, they 
discuss that governments must limit their actuation to the minimum activities and 
compromises in the economy, in order to maximize people and electors´ satisfaction. That 
comes in line with another interesting finding: countries with left-wing governments, show 
small life satisfaction than the other ones, for the reason that show more high government 
expenditures (Bjørnskov et al., 2006). The authors used aggregated data for life satisfaction 
and other macroeconomic variables, running regressions for at most seventy observations, a 
different approach to ours, which bases on micro data. Moreover, their approach did not 
correct for the cyclical effect of government expenditures and includes both government 
consumption and investment. 
In fact, none of these articles analyzed the effect of the government size independently of 
the effect of expansions or recessions. We fill this gap, concentrating on structural 
measures. In fact, it is possible that agents value positively the countercyclical measures 
governments take to overcome or alleviate recessions. Thus the positive effects obtained so 
far in the literature may overestimate the effects of government expenditures on the 
alleviation of recessions. The fact that the most positive effects were obtained from the 
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welfare state expenditures, namely for unemployment protection may be suggestive of this 
idea. 
Following the argument stressed by (Deaton, 2011) then applied to the effects of financial 
markets, we also consider that the conditional effects of the government weight in the 
economy and government imbalances may reflect, not only the desire for a stable 
macroeconomic environment and balanced government accounts, but also the fear from 





Data and Methods 
We collected data from the European Quality of Life Surveys (EQLS) - waves 2003 and 2007 - 
concerning individual characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, education, number 
of children, type of habitation, income, main economic status (professions), number of 
hours worked, life satisfaction, happiness, and health. Life satisfaction is measured on a 1 
to 10 scale of the answers to the question ‘All things considered, how satisfied you say you 
are with your life?’, while happiness is measured on a 1 to 10 scale of the answers to the 
question ‘Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?’ 
Concerning the effect of government size on happiness and life satisfaction we choose two 
forms of structural government expenditures: (1) the ratio of government expenditures to 
the trend of GDP (trend calculated country by country through the Hoddrick-Prescott filter), 
   ̅ and (2) the ratio of trend government expenditures to the trend of GDP (trend of both 
variables calculated country by country through the Hoddrick-Prescott filter),  ̅  ̅ (named 
Stgov1).  
These variables were taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0 and considering the time span 
from 1980 to 2010 to calculate the trend of both series. International organizations tend to 
consider trend GDP to calculate structural deficits. However they tend to calculated the 
structural component of government expenditures by subtracting cyclical expenditures 
mainly associated with unemployment protection (see e.g. Bodmer and Geier, 2004).  
Due to the fact that some other government expenditures may be also cyclical (e.g. poverty 
relief expenditures) and the difficulty on estimating natural unemployment for each 
country, we use the trend variable to evaluate the long-run component. However, just to 
compare with the total government size, we also calculate    ̅, which we name Stgov 
below. 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results, we also use structural measures of 
government size (such as deficits and debts), calculated as so by Eurostat, in a following 
chapter of the present study. We have averaged structural government expenditures from 
1996 to 2003 and from 2000 to 2007 and associated it with happiness in 2003 and 2007, 
respectively. With this option we are focusing on the effect of government consumption (not 
including government capital expenditures, as the majority of previous contributions) on 
happiness.  
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For us this allows to disentangle positive effects of government investments in growth or 
externalities that could be valued positively by agents. Moreover, as some of previous 
references have pointed out positive effects of the welfare state, current expenditures are 
close to the state roles which are linked with the welfare state. A last reason has made us 
choose these variables to our benchmark analyses.  
Government consumption is the variable linked with government policy that has been most 
related to economic growth, with a negative influence (e.g. Hauk and Wackziarg, 2009). If 
government consumption would be positively related to happiness or life satisfaction (as 
previous works seem to suggest), there would be a trade-off between growth and welfare 
implied by government consumption and so a reason why politicians may reasonably 
increase this type of expenditures. However, if the result were the opposite, there would be 
no reasonable argument that supports policies that systematically increase government 
consumption. 
As we can observe through the figures below (Figure 1 to Figure 4), there is a clear negative 
correlation between the government´ weight and the indices Happiness and Life 
Satisfaction. In the analysis that follows, we will examine if this relationship found is robust, 














Figure 1: Relationship between Happiness and STGOV1 in 2003 
 
Source: Calculated based upon data from EQLS 2003 (for Happiness) and PWT (for Stgov1). 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Happiness and STGOV1 in 2007 
 
Source: Calculated based upon data from EQLS 2007 (for Happiness) and PWT (for Stgov1). 
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Figure 3: Relationship between Life Satisfaction and STGOV1 in 2003 
 
Source: Calculated based upon data from EQLS 2003 (for Life Satisfaction) and PWT (for Stgov1). 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between Life Satisfaction and STGOV1 in 2007 
 
Source: Calculated based upon data from EQLS 2007 (for Life Satisfaction) and PWT (for Stgov1). 
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Additionally, in order to access the influence of a number of variables calculated by 
international organizations, namely those calculated by the Eurostat and used for the 
excessive deficit procedure by the European Commission, we also include debt (general 
government consolidated gross debt) and deficits (the negative of the structural balance of 
general government), both in percentage of potential (trend) GDP.  Details on definitions 
and data sources of variables are in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
We estimate through Ordered Probit and OLS the following benchmark regression on life 
satisfaction and happiness (we name these dependent variables WB). 
                                                               
  
                                                                      
∑               
  
      ∑              
  
      ∑              
  
      
               (1) 
Where incj,it is the household´s total net monthly income
5, heaj,i,t is the individual health 
conditions ranging between 1 (very good) and 5 (very bad), Eduj,i,t is the education level 
(measured in ISCED levels in 2007 and in major education levels in 2003),         is the age 
category, which also appears squared in regressions,                is a dummy that sets 
1 if the individual is unemployed in less than 12 months,               is a dummy that 
sets 1 if the individual is unemployed for more than 12 months,         is the number of 
weekly hours worked,          is the number of children,          is gender, assuming 1 for 
male and 2 for female,             are a set of professional categories dummies, 
           are a set of dummies for house features linked with the nature of the property, 
          is a set of dummies for marriage status (for married, divorced, widowed and 
never married), and finally         is one of the two structural deficits measures discussed 
above. The suffix _d in variables names means a dummy variable, i is the country indicator 
(EQLS 2003 includes 28 European countries and EQLS 2007 includes 31 European countries) 
and t = 2003, 2007. Dependent variables are alternatively Life Satisfaction and Happiness. 
                                                 
5
 Some previous papers, as MacKerron (2011) noted, discovered that relative income is more important 
than absolute income in the explanation of wellbeing. However, some others as Angeles (2009) and 
Pauvels et al (2008) prefer to use individual income to explain wellbeing. In particular, the last paper 
discovered that individual income gains importance if one takes into account the hours worked, as we 
also do. However, we tested the inclusion of relative income (individual income/average income, with 
the denominator been obtained through averaging all observations within each country. Although this 
variable becomes highly significant (more than absolute individual income, as is also pointed out in 
previous literature), this does not change any of our results and in particular it does not change the 
significance of other variables. These alternative results are available upon request. 
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The dummies were included in regressions but are omitted in tables to allow for better 
readability and because their analysis is not at the core of our analysis.  
This means that in our model there are individual effects and macro-effects as in Di Tella 
and MacCulloch (2008) and Hessami (2011). In our case, however, macro-effects are 
measured by government variables. The descriptive statistics for the main variables are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the main variables 
 
Data for 2007 Data for 2003 
Variable N Average Std. Dev. Min Max N Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
Happiness 35380 7.336405 1.924874 1 10 25654 7.289429 1.98574 1 10 
Life Satisf 35472 6.888786 2.166989 1 10 25991 6.746528 2.216835 1 10 
Income 20328 1617.74 3482.832 2 250000 20498 1257.517 1296.985 75 5625 
Unemp_sr 35634 0.0206825 0.1423211 0 1 26257 0.0285638 0.1665802 0 1 
Unemp_lr 35634 0.0308133 0.1728139 0 1 26257 0.0360285 0.1863646 0 1 
Hours Worked 29983 40.28606 11.7069 1 168 21312 41.30546 12.7853 1 140 
Education 35011 3.947331 1.355418 1 7 26105 1.97376 0.7336173 1 4 
Health 35570 2.330391 0.966463 1 5 26191 3.010271 1.145108 1 5 
Age 35634 1.971263 0.6838658 1 3 26257 3.261721 1.273282 1 5 
Mar_1 35364 0.6185665 0.4857454 0 1 26257 0.5898998 0.491861 0 1 
Mar_2 35634 0.0930291 0.2904773 0 1 26257 0.0932323 0.2907632 0 1 
Mar_3 35634 0.1162934 0.320581 0 1 26257 0.1213772 0.3265713 0 1 
Mar_4 35634 0.1645339 0.3707645 0 1 26257 0.1866169 0.3896111 0 1 
Children 35359 1.655279 1.383903 0 14 25938 1.596345 1.428991 0 15 
Gender 35634 1.568895 0.4952377 1 2 26257 1.581026 0.4934005 1 2 
Stgov 35634 0.0747789 0.0195345 0.0424802 0.1387043 26257 0.0809 0.0245646 0.0433155 0.1368173 
Stgov1 35634 0.0747743 0.0191848 0.0416576 0.1341795 26257 0.0798974 0.0241151 0.0429177 0.145888 
Notes: In order to keep the table as simple as possible, summary statistics for dummies for professional and house categories aren´t shown 
 
The number of observations is around 26000 for 2003 and 35000 for 2007. Structural 
Government Expenditure (Stgov) is measured in percentage between 4% and 14%. Structural 
Government Expenditures with trended Government consumption (Stgov1) is measured in 
percentage, and oscillate between 4% and 13,4% in 2007 and between 4% and 14,5% in 2003. 
It is worth noting that correlations between explanatory variables rarely overcome 30% (the 
only exceptions being the one between children and age and the one between age and 
health), which implies no concern with multicollienarity. 
We present both estimations from OPROB and OLS. While the OLS coefficients are more 
straightforward to interpret, OPROB estimations are more appropriated to estimations of 
equations in which the dependent variable is ordinal, i.e. that have a natural order but not 





In this chapter, we divided the results obtained by typology of the variables studied in each 
pair of regressions, making the discussing into the presentation of each result. In point 4.1 we 
show results of the effect of structural government consumption in individual wellbeing; in 
point 4.2 we show the effect of alternative measures of government imbalances in individual 
wellbeing, by the introduction of the variables Structural Deficits and Structural Debt; in 
point 4.3, we show the results of regressions from differences across the income distribution 
and across euro zone and non-euro zone countries; in point 4.4 we show the robustness tests 
by introducing more macroeconomic variables such GDP per capita (in natural logarithms) and 
Inflation.  
4.1 The effect of Structural Government Consumption in 
Individual Wellbeing 
In this section we will present our main results, concerning the influence of structural 
government expenditure in happiness or life satisfaction.  
Firstly we want to analyze the individual features effects in happiness and life satisfaction. 
A first note is worth mentioning to say that results in happiness and life satisfaction are 
incredibly close. Coefficients also do not change between regressions that do not include 
government expenditure and those which included those variables.  
From Table 2 we can observe highly significant and positive effects of income, education, 
number of children, being female, being married6 and health effects (note that health is 
measured in inverse order, e.g. better health corresponds to lower numbers) as well as 
negative effects of long-run and short-run unemployment (short-run unemployment 
decreases its significance in OLS regressions), hours worked (only in OLS regressions). Age 
presents a U-shaped relationship with wellbeing. These results are generally consistent with 
previous evidence on the individual effects on happiness (see e.g. MacKerron 2012).  
In fact the literature has consistently presented positive effects of income, ‘being married’ 
and health and negative effects of unemployment and a U-shaped relationship with age. 
Although not so common, negative effects of working hours have been also presented by 
Pouwels et al. (2008) and Hoorn (2008).  
                                                 
6
 Other dummies for the married status such as divorced and widowed, not presented in Tables, have 
significant negative effects. 
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Despite of the existence of mixed effects of education and having children in the literature 
there are a lot of papers that also present positive effects (e.g. Di Tella et al. (2001) and 
Hayo and Seifert (2003) for education effects and Angeles (2009) for a positive effect of 
children). Columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6) and (7)-(10) test the introduction of structural 
government consumption in regressions and present significantly positive effects.  
In Table 3 the same specifications are applied to the 2003 dataset. Despite the different 
sample and the different year to which the survey was applied, results are incredibly 
similar. We can again observe highly significant and positive effects of income, education, 
number of children, being male, being married and health effects as well as negative 
effects of long-run and short-run unemployment and hours worked (only in OLS regressions), 
together with a non-linear typical relationship with age.  
Taking into account the OLS estimations, the effects of structural government expenditures 
on wellbeing mean that a 1% increase in government expenditures in percentage of GDP 
implies less 0.07 to less 0.42 in the happiness and/or life satisfaction scales meaning a 
decrease 0.7% to 4.2% of the whole scale. This also means that a 5% increase in government 
expenditures in % of GDP may imply a decrease in wellbeing of 4.5% to 10.5%, representing 




Table 2: Regressions for Wellbeing in 2007 
Method Ordered Probit  OLS   





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant -- -- -- -- -- -- 
8.908435*** 8.924673*** 8.246053*** 8.282006*** 
(0.4376194) (0.4375811) (0.5228545) (0.5216138) 
Income 
0.00000324* 0.00000324* 0.00000324* 0.00000630** 0.00000630** 0.00000630** 0.0000156*** 0.0000153*** 0.0000326*** 0.0000321*** 
(0.00000192) (0.00000192) (0.00000192) (0.00000280) (0.00000280) (0.00000280) (0.00000543) (0.00000538) (0.0000111) (0.000011) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3253964*** -0.3253964*** -0.3253964*** -0.3416401*** -0.3416401*** -0.3416401*** -0.2786565 -0.2802844 -0.5485936* -0.5509983* 
(0.1119254) (0.1119254) (0.1119254) (0.1182577) (0.1182577) (0.1182577) (0.2913106) (0.2908684) (0.3305154) (0.329653) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4114606*** -0.4114606*** -0.4114606*** -0.4750684*** -0.4750684*** -0.4750684*** -0.5654893** -0.5653744** -0.9727996*** -0.9723034*** 
(0.1054442) (0.1054442) (0.1054442) (0.1123546) (0.1123546) (0.1123546) (0.2850709) (0.2846065) (0.3223266) (0.3213513) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0004002 -0.0004002 -0.0004002 -0.0012928 -0.0012928 -0.0012928 -0.0062292*** -0.0061534*** -0.0094005*** -0.009265*** 
(0.0008242) (0.0008242) (0.0008242) (0.0008129) (0.0008129) (0.0008129) (0.0013275) (0.0013278) (0.0014764) (0.0014763) 
Education 
0.0433858*** 0.0433858*** 0.0433858*** 0.0553147*** 0.0553147*** 0.0553147*** 0.1376807*** 0.1382745*** 0.1944765*** 0.1955898*** 
(0.0070014) (0.0070014) (0.0070014) (0.0070338) (0.0070338) (0.0070338) (0.0109365) (0.0109397) (0.0128151) (0.0128178) 
Health 
-0.4025707*** -0.4025707*** -0.4025707*** -0.3336939*** -0.3336939*** -0.3336939*** -0.656023*** -0.6548362*** -0.6315378*** -0.6294041*** 
(0.0107717) (0.0107717) (0.0107717) (0.0106194) (0.0106194) (0.0106194) (0.0168559) (0.0168625) (0.0186942) (0.018701) 
Age 
-0.4936903*** -0.4936903*** -0.4936903*** -0.4212954*** -0.4212954*** -0.4212954*** -0.7221477*** -0.7228026*** -0.6514263*** -0.6525312*** 
(0.0733333) (0.0733333) (0.0733333) (0.0734732) (0.0734732) (0.0734732) (0.1182457) (0.1182698) (0.1361452) (0.1362051) 
Age2 
0.111361*** 0.111361*** 0.111361*** 0.1169483*** 0.1169483*** 0.1169483*** 0.1844776*** 0.1844057*** 0.2163215*** 0.2161609*** 
(0.0188314) (0.0188314) (0.0188314) (0.0190846) (0.0190846) (0.0190846) (0.0307392) (0.0307471) (0.0352877) (0.0353041) 
Married 
0.3811907*** 0.3811907*** 0.3811907*** 0.2473287*** 0.2473287*** 0.2473287*** 0.7302369*** 0.7304895*** 0.4236384*** 0.4238679*** 
(0.0283387) (0.0283387) (0.0283387) (0.0277047) (0.0277047) (0.0277047) (0.0504122) (0.0504335) (0.0563734) (0.0564148) 
Children 
0.0273806*** 0.0273806*** 0.0273806*** 0.0164** 0.0164** 0.0164** 0.057784*** 0.057781*** 0.056638*** 0.0566317*** 
(0.0076089) (0.0076089) (0.0076089) (0.0076766) (0.0076766) (0.0076766) (0.0123764) (0.0123695) (0.0140446) (0.0140395) 
Gender 
0.069363*** 0.069363*** 0.069363*** 0.0404152** 0.0404152** 0.0404152** 0.0988221*** 0.0983017*** 0.0218993 0.0211131 























(1.675587) (1.737781) (0.7467096) (0.8699706) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0795 0.0795 0.0795 0.0847 0.0847 0.0847 0.2323 0.2319 0.2302 0.2296 
Number Obs. 17244 17244 17244 17251 17251 17251 17244 17244 17251 17251 
 
Notes: Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant.  Marital Status, professional, housing and country dummies 




Table 3: Regressions for Wellbeing in 2003 
Method Ordered Probit  OLS   





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant -- -- -- -- -- -- 
9.271282*** 9.383672*** 8.307373*** 8.386828*** 
(0.3235361) (0.3218961) (0.359201) (0.3599114) 
Income 
0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.0001017*** 0.0001017*** 0.0001017*** 0.0002103*** 0.0001989*** 0.0003787*** 0.0003698*** 
(0.00000872) (0.00000872) (0.00000872) (0.00000881) (0.00000881) (0.00000881) (0.0000114) (0.0000114) (0.0000127) (0.0000127) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3923318*** -0.3923318*** -0.3923318*** -0.1630192 -0.1630192 -0.1630192 -0.6770241*** -0.6608273*** -0.4104402* -0.3838719 
(0.1346769) (0.1346769) (0.1346769) (0.1241655) (0.1241655) (0.1241655) (0.2209724) (0.2208957) (0.2371154) (0.2390753) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4855478*** -0.4855478*** -0.4855478*** -0.2563611** -0.2563611** -0.2563611** -0.9348814*** -0.9075121*** -0.7408687*** -0.6998154*** 
(0.1327912) (0.1327912) (0.1327912) (0.1225157) (0.1225157) (0.1225157) (0.2186781) (0.218589) (0.2345927) (0.2366777) 
Hours Worked 
0.000651 0.000651 0.000651 -0.0004375 -0.0004375 -0.0004375 -0.0008669 -0.0007542 -0.0045265*** -0.0044286*** 
(0.0007158) (0.0007158) (0.0007158) (0.0007243) (0.0007243) (0.0007243) (0.0011751) (0.0011749) (0.0013269) (0.0013263) 
Education 
0.0738424*** 0.0738424*** 0.0738424*** 0.0946408*** 0.0946408*** 0.0946408*** 0.125167*** 0.1315245*** 0.1496074*** 0.1568098*** 
(0.0124539) (0.0124539) (0.0124539) (0.0125244) (0.0125244) (0.0125244) (0.0208872) (0.020908) (0.0225737) (0.022576) 
Health 
-0.3597083*** -0.3597083*** -0.3597083*** -0.2903714*** -0.2903714*** -0.2903714*** -0.5819616*** -0.5816426*** -0.5436979*** -0.5446148*** 
(0.0097698) (0.0097698) (0.0097698) (0.0093471) (0.0093471) (0.0093471) (0.0144379) (0.0144143) (0.0157607) (0.0157343) 
Age 
-0.2750215*** -0.2750215*** -0.2750215*** -0.3390571*** -0.3390571*** -0.3390571*** -0.420471*** -0.4156832*** -0.5711091*** -0.565342*** 
(0.0438874) (0.0438874) (0.0438874) (0.0443508) (0.0443508) (0.0443508) (0.0728273) (0.0727576) (0.0814014) (0.0813208) 
Age2 
0.0425908*** 0.0425908*** 0.0425908*** 0.0601597*** 0.0601597*** 0.0601597*** 0.0739467*** 0.0734761*** 0.1157746*** 0.1152736*** 
(0.0071709) (0.0071709) (0.0071709) (0.0072363) (0.0072363) (0.0072363) (0.011955) (0.0119357) (0.0132617) (0.0132373) 
Married 
0.3736779*** 0.3736779*** 0.3736779*** 0.1964823*** 0.1964823*** 0.1964823*** 0.7839721*** 0.7858007*** 0.3520444*** 0.3501406*** 
(0.0273709) (0.0273709) (0.0273709) (0.0272644) (0.0272644) (0.0272644) (0.0555901) (0.0554051) (0.0593988) (0.0591814) 
Children 
0.0241429*** 0.0241429*** 0.0241429*** 0.0120988* 0.0120988* 0.0120988* 0.0317933*** 0.0295716** 0.0085037 0.0070545 
(0.0072689) (0.0072689) (0.0072689) (0.0073352) (0.0073352) (0.0073352) (0.0123717) (0.0123794) (0.0135364) (0.0135283) 
Gender 
0.100905*** 0.100905*** 0.100905*** 0.0994375*** 0.0994375*** 0.0994375*** 0.1478176*** 0.1528428*** 0.1528521*** 0.1571918*** 























(10.86773) (10.79502) (0.706923) (0.7532219) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0811 0.0811 0.0811 0.0951 0.0951 0.0951 0.2435 0.2467 0.2686 0.2720 
Number Obs. 16364 16364 16364 16551 16551 16551 16364 16364 16551 16551 
Notes: Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant.  Marital Status, professional, housing and country dummies 
included in regressions but omitted from the Table. Country dummies are excluded from OLS regressions due to collinearity. 
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Table 4 presents the marginal effects of regressors on wellbeing regarding ordered probit 
estimations, as coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as in OLS. These values may be 
interpreted as the probability of reporting 10 (the maximum scale of wellbeing, for both 
variables) due to a unit increase in each variable. 
Table 4: Marginal effects for reporting maximum Wellbeing (Ordered Probit) 
 2007  2003 
Dep. Var. 
Variables 
Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Income 0.0000005* 0.0000008** 0.000009*** 0.00001*** 
Unemployment_sr -0.0372*** -0.0333*** -0.0477*** -0.0154 
Unemployment_lr -0.0446*** -0.0423*** -0.0556*** -0.0226*** 
Hours Worked -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.00005 
Education 0.0062*** 0.0070*** 0.0116*** 0.0101*** 
Health -0.0579*** -0.0420*** -0.0567*** -.0311*** 
Age -0.0710*** -0.0530*** -0.0433*** -0.0363*** 
Age2 0.0160*** 0.0147 0.0067*** 0.0064*** 
Married 0.0512*** 0.0296*** 0.0555*** 0.0203*** 
Children 0.0039*** 0.0021** 0.0038** 0.0012** 














Values in the table mean that additional 100 euro in the monthly income increases 
wellbeing in 0.005% to 0.1%, a relatively modest effect, and with higher effects in 2003 
when compared to 2007.  
However, being unemployed decreases the probability of reporting the highest wellbeing in 
from 1.5% to nearly 5%, one additional level of education increases the probability of 
reporting 10 in wellbeing from 0.7% to nearly 1.2% and the effect of one additional health 
point oscillate between 4.2% and 8% rise in the probability of reporting the highest 
wellbeing level. Belonging to an additional age scale decreases 5.30% to 7.10% the 
probability of reporting 10; being married increases 2.96% to 5.12% the probability of 
reporting the highest wellbeing. Having children and being female have more modest effects 
of nearly 0.2% (to 0.4%) and 0.5% (to 1.6%), respectively, of reporting highest wellbeing. The 
quantitative effect of size of governments is remarkable: an additional 1% of GDP in 
structural government expenditure decreases the probability of reporting the highest 
wellbeing from 2.2% to 6.7%. 
Do this effect of government structural expenditures is specific for the used variables or it 
indeed represents a deeper mechanism through which government size and imbalances can 
influence wellbeing?  
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In order to answer this question we enlarge our definition of government size and test the 
influence of alternative variables such as government debt and deficits, calculated by the 
Eurostat in order to access the excessive deficits EU mechanism, which are now calculated 
excluding the cyclical component. If high debt and high deficits decrease wellbeing we can 
be more confident on our purposed explanation that relies on the negative effect 
macroeconomic government imbalances may have in wellbeing due to the expectations for 
future taxes and anticipated austerity measures.  
In the following subsection we thus present results for regressions with the alternative 
measures of government imbalances. 
4.2 The effect of alternative measures of government 
imbalances in individual wellbeing 
In this subsection we test the relationship between other variables that measure public 
finance imbalances. In this case, contrary to what has been done earlier, we choose directly 
available variables from the Eurostat, in particular those that serve to the excessive deficit 
procedure.  
Firstly, we use the structural balance of general government (the negative of the deficit), 













Table 5: Regressions for the influence of Structural Deficits on Wellbeing 2007 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.152001*** 7.895816*** 
  (0.4593724) (0.5362243) 
Income 
0.00000302 0.00000668** 0.0000046* 0.0000116** 
(0.00000201) (0.0000032) (0.0000027) (0.00000496) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3989941*** -0.3812285*** -0.611651*** -0.6844939*** 
(0.1217822) (0.1265099) (0.1950518) (0.2375645) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4728435*** -0.4602874*** -0.7695548*** -0.8992113*** 
(0.1143747) (0.1200266) (0.1846912) (0.2243589) 
Hours Worked 
0.0000471 -0.00083 -0.0003815 -0.0019673 
(0.0009022) (0.0009132) (0.0014003) (0.0015965) 
Education 
0.0392657*** 0.0571248*** 0.0724802*** 0.1076615*** 
(0.0075009) (0.0075841) (0.0115107) (0.0131294) 
Health 
-0.4052238*** -0.332615*** -0.6330755*** -0.5785695*** 




-0.4020285*** -0.7224199*** -0.7118062*** 
(0.1396829) (0.0794022) (0.1207544) 
Age2 
0.1115573*** 0.1130982*** 0.1610844*** 0.1945019*** 




0.2572562*** 0.5707951*** 0.4136195*** 




0.0202083** 0.0585839*** 0.0302711** 




0.0316842* 0.0743292*** 0.0407635 
(0.0324951) (0.0184257) (0.028677) 
Structural Balance 







Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0801 0.0821 0.2765 0.2886 
Number Obs. 14810 14816 14810 14816 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional, housing and country dummies included in regressions but 
omitted from the Table. 
 
In Table 5 we present regressions in which we substitute the structural expenditure variable 
that we used earlier with the new structural balance measure, a measure that is only 
available for the 2007 database (as the available data begins in 2003 and we assume that an 
average 2003-2007 of previous years deficits is influencing wellbeing in the current year).  
We obtain similar values for the effects of individual effects and a strongly positive effect of 
government balances (which is equivalent to a negative effect of deficits). This effect means 
that a 1% increase in the structural balance of the government accounts would increase 
wellbeing in an amount that oscillates between 0.066 and 0.20. Thus, a 5% improvement on 
government accounts would imply an increase in 1 (in 10) level of life satisfaction and 
happiness.  
According to ordered probit analysis, an additional 1% in deficit/GDP would decrease the 
probability of reporting the level 10 of happiness on about 1.05% (or in the case of life 
satisfaction, 1.4%). 
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Table 6: Regressions for the influence of Structural Debt on Wellbeing in 2007 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.093137*** 8.086202*** 
  (0.4421414) (0.5234773) 
Income 
0.00000324* 0.0000063** 0.00000472* 0.0000113** 
(0.00000192) (0.0000028) (0.00000257) (0.00000443) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3253964*** -0.3416401*** -0.3930418 -0.6223497** 
(0.1119254) (0.1182577) (0.2722905) (0.3080155) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4114606*** -0.4750684*** -0.5875738** -0.9386531*** 
(0.1054442) (0.1123546) (0.2655505) (0.2986186) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0004002 -0.0012928 -0.0011674 -0.0029939** 
(0.0008242) (0.0008129) (0.0013188) (0.0014484) 
Education 
0.0433858*** 0.0553147*** 0.0797399*** 0.1057201*** 
(0.0070014) (0.0070338) (0.0110163) (0.0123066) 
Health 
-0.4025707*** -0.3336939*** -0.6429343*** -0.58471*** 




-0.4212954*** -0.7397847*** -0.7511699*** 
(0.1307176) (0.0734732) (0.1148792) 
Age2 
0.111361*** 0.1169483*** 0.1636763*** 0.2016455*** 




0.2473287*** 0.7342814*** 0.3931638*** 




0.0164** 0.0409411*** 0.0216473 




0.0404152** 0.0980215*** 0.0540058* 








Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0795 0.0847 0.2778 0.2980 
Number Obs. 17244 17251 17244 17251 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional, housing and country dummies included in regressions but 
omitted from the Table. 
 
In Table 6, we use the general government consolidated gross debt calculated for the 
excessive deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995) – averaged from 2002 to 2007 corresponding 
to the 2007 database and from 1998 to 2003 corresponding to the 2003 database, which 
results are presented in Table 7 - as a measure of the government size.  
We obtain similar values for the effects of individual effects and a strongly negative effect of 
debts. In this case, an additional 1% in debt/GDP would decrease wellbeing in 0.01. Thus, to 
decrease a one level scale in wellbeing, it would be necessary a rise in structural debt equal 
to 100% of GDP.  
According to ordered probit analysis, an additional 1% in debt/GDP would decrease the 
probability of reporting the level 10 of happiness on about 1.2%. (or in the case of life 
satisfaction, 1.6%). 
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Table 7: Regressions for the influence of Structural Debt on Wellbeing in 2003 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Var. Dep. Happiness Life Satisfaction Happiness Life Satisfaction 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 8.535198*** 6.563614*** 
  (0.3293872) (0.3593119) 
Income 
0.00006*** 0.0001017*** 0.0000851*** 0.0001624*** 
(0.00000872) (0.00000881) (0.0000132) (0.0000141) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3923318*** -0.1630192 -0.6122368*** -0.3183591 
(0.1346769) (0.1241655) (0.215857) (0.2248268) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4855478*** -0.2563611** -0.8104646*** -0.5483238** 
(0.1327912) (0.1225157) (0.2140113) (0.2227633) 
Hours Worked 
0.000651 -0.0004375 0.0009517 -0.0008534 
(0.0007158) (0.0007243) (0.0011747) (0.0012954) 
Education 
0.0738424*** 0.0946408*** 0.14637*** 0.1893028*** 
(0.0124539) (0.0125244) (0.0205707) (0.0219483) 
Health 
-0.3597083*** -0.2903714*** -0.5698401*** -0.4995031*** 




-0.3390571*** -0.4173913*** -0.5818934*** 
(0.0783632) (0.0443508) (0.0713384) 
Age2 
0.0425908*** 0.0601597*** 0.0643098*** 0.1021738*** 




0.1964823*** 0.8112679*** 0.389683*** 




0.0120988* 0.0367935*** 0.0140728 




0.0994375*** 0.1500234*** 0.1635632*** 








Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0811 0.0951 0.2833 0.3347 
Number Obs. 16364 16551 16364 16551 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional, housing and country dummies included in regressions but 
omitted from the Table. 
 
Table 7 confirms the results obtained so far for the influence of debt in the wellbeing 
measure in 2003, specifically in the Ordered Probit regressions. There is a quantitatively 
smaller positive effect of debt in the OLS regression for life satisfaction. Moreover, with a 1% 
(of GDP) increase in structural debt, the probability of reporting 10 in wellbeing will decrease 
on 0.39% (if wellbeing is measured by happiness) or 0.16% (if wellbeing is measured by life 
satisfaction), a quite lower effect than that obtained in 2007. From OLS regression, a 1% (of 
GDP) increase in structural debt would contribute to increase life satisfaction in 0.008, which 
is a quantitatively small effect as it means that to increase 1 unit in the welfare scale, the 
country would have to rise 125% (of GDP)! 
Thus, with two exceptions in the OLS regressions for 2003, all variables linked with the 
government size, calculated excluding the effects of business cycles, decrease significantly 
wellbeing in European countries. 
 24 
4.3 Differences across the income distribution and across 
countries from the Euro zone and others 
In this section we want to evaluate if the negative effect of government imbalances in 
wellbeing is different between different income levels and differs between euro zone 
countries and non-euro countries.7  
The first issue is important as the literature points out that the eventual positive effects of 
government size in wellbeing may be due welfare policies, thus affecting essentially the 
poorest in the society. We consider high-income people that presented a monthly income that 
is above the fourth quartile and low-income people those who earn a monthly income that is 
below the median.  
The second issue is important to access potential differences in the effect of government size 
on wellbeing between the countries of the Eurozone and countries out of the Eurozone. It 
would be reasonable to assume that the tighter budgetary limits under the euro area would 
imply a lower effect of government structural deficits/expenditures in wellbeing. In this 
section, due to similarities in the results between several tested specifications, we will not 
present results for Life Satisfaction and the influence of structural government (Stgov). 
However, these regressions are available upon request.  
Table 8 analyses the differences from the consideration of a sample with the Euro countries 
and another with other European Countries for the 2007 data. Table 9 does the same but for 
the 2003 data. Table 10 analyses the differences from the consideration of a sample with the 
richest people in the sample and a sample of the poorest people in the sample. Table 11 does 







                                                 
7
 As in this case we are dealing with more homogeneous (and smaller) samples, we did not introduce 
country dummies. Also some of the ordered probit regressions have convergence problems when country 
dummies are included. 
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Table 8: Regressions for Wellbeing 2007 (Happiness) - euro versus non-euro countries 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Countries Euro Non-euro Euro Non-euro 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.568148*** 9.844022*** 
  (0.4133738) (0.4591209) 
Income 
0.00000854* 0.00000741* 0.0000134* 0.0000113* 
(0.00000496) (0.00000402) (0.00000726) (0.00000587) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.4061119*** -0.2242752 -0.1726138 -0.3628983 
(0.1482891) (0.173098) (0.349504) (0.2981225) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4797851*** -0.4068601** -0.3282303 -0.7541306*** 
(0.1361309) (0.1658498) (0.337628) (0.2859747) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0007465 -0.0062319*** -0.0019358 -0.0111902*** 
(0.0011325) (0.0011539) (0.0017443) (0.0019957) 
Education 
0.0599738*** 0.0907292*** 0.1032501*** 0.1681531*** 
(0.0088756) (0.0105141) (0.0133168) (0.0179658) 
Health 
-0.3885992*** -0.3932346*** -0.594284*** -0.6758371*** 




-0.4032876*** -0.728965*** -0.6375953*** 
(0.1777471) (0.1044307) (0.1534967) 
Age2 
0.1153914*** 0.1084991*** 0.1664231*** 0.1677141*** 




0.3627716*** 0.7307092*** 0.6149431*** 




0.0072491 0.0818325*** 0.0033682 




0.1111339*** 0.0371588 0.1707168*** 









Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0579 0.0739 0.2032 0.2656 
Number Obs. 8579 8665 8579 8665 
Notes 
Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); **(5%); 
*(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital Status, 
professional and housing dummies included but omitted from the Table. 
 
There are interesting differences between effects within the Euro zone and effects outside 
the Eurozone: having children seems to contribute to wellbeing within the countries of the 
Euro (in opposition to what happens in countries outside the Euro zone) and being male seems 
to increase wellbeing in countries out of the Euro zone while this is not a significant 
determinant of wellbeing in the Euro zone.  
There are different statistical significances of unemployment in two groups of countries 
although the differences obtained through the different estimators are not consistent. 
Concerning the effect of structural government expenditures, it seems clear that the effect 




Table 9: Regressions for Wellbeing 2003 (Happiness) - euro versus non-euro countries 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Countries Euro Non-euro Euro Non-euro 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.955948*** 9.107915*** 
  (0.353643) (0.5121071) 
Income 
0.0001229*** 0.00012*** 0.0001999*** 0.0001949*** 
(0.00000969) (0.0000119) (0.0000145) (0.0000187) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.4393708*** -0.3627788 -0.6953463*** -0.3082216 
(0.1554018) (0.2397473) (0.2338912) (0.335646) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.5543784*** -0.4549501* -0.9913455*** -0.4658808 
(0.1565406) (0.234553) (0.2416252) (0.3240451) 
Hours Worked 
0.000684 -0.0010077 0.0006766 -0.0022035 
(0.0009507) (0.0010245) (0.0014689) (0.0018478) 
Education 
0.0191021 0.1079797*** 0.0477642* 0.2207662*** 
(0.0173121) (0.0175302) (0.0280206) (0.0309773) 
Health 
-0.3540828*** -0.359244*** -0.5361274*** -0.6239364*** 
(0.0129667) (0.0136111) (0.0189145) (0.022532) 
Age -0.3052281*** 
(0.0599948) 
-0.2333526*** -0.4681171*** -0.3756706*** 
(0.1156225) (0.0643621) (0.0915937) 
Age2 
0.0486157*** 0.0435429*** 0.0754449*** 0.0710835*** 
(0.0099402) (0.0102383) (0.0153085) (0.0185004) 
Married 0.3384212*** 
(0.0358512) 
0.2996646*** 0.4953292*** 0.5190673*** 
(0.0755466) (0.0420085) (0.0567593) 
Children 0.0172804* 
(0.0095494) 
0.0247579** 0.0254036* 0.0353257* 
(0.0206338) (0.0114784) (0.0151994) 
Gender 0.034055 
(0.0239688) 
0.167137*** 0.0412643 0.274095*** 









Pseudo R2/ R2 8718 7646 0.2106 0.2626 
Number Obs. 0.0610 0.0738 8718 7646 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional and housing dummies included but omitted from the Table. 
 
In 2003 some differences between the Euro zone and other countries also arise. 
Unemployment is now clearly more important as a determinant of wellbeing in the Euro 
countries. Now, education, having children and being male are stronger determinants of 
welfare out of the euro zone than with the euro countries. Concerning the effect of structural 
government expenditures, we note that the 2007 results does not confirm in 2003. In this year 
both groups of countries present a significantly negative effect, with no relevant distinction 
between them. 
There are also interesting differences in the determinants of wellbeing between the richest 
and the poorest. In fact, for high-income earners, income and unemployment are not 
statistically significant in the explanation of wellbeing, a quite intuitive result. It seems that 
there is also a less significant effect of structural government expenditures in high-income 
agents than in the poorest. This indicates that our effect is different from the potential 
positive effect of welfare state expenditures in the wellbeing of the poorest, supporting our 
approach on the analysis of the influence of structural expenditures, which excludes counter-
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cyclical expenditures such as unemployment subsidies or some measures for the alleviation of 
poverty. 
Table 10: Regressions for Wellbeing 2007 (Happiness) - differences between High-Income 
and Low-Income earners 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Individuals High-Income Low-Income High-Income Low-Income 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 8.686379*** 7.777394*** 
  (0.7025152) (0.5805595) 
Income 
-0.0000000527 0.0006612*** 0.000000661 0.0012422*** 
0.00000164 0.0000562 (0.00000190) 0.0001007 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.2765138 -0.2973768* -0.2006755 -0.1709532 
0.1918318 0.1584862 (0.3407431) 0.4072372 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.1027897 -0.4291308*** -- -0.4338661 
0.2246365 0.1509682  0.3979505 
Hours Worked 
-0.0003298 -0.0026463** -0.0011353 -0.0052094** 
0.0016151 0.0011489 (0.0020309) 0.0020842 
Education 
0.0247298** 0.0936287*** 0.0416819*** 0.1713247*** 
0.0125276 0.011179 (0.0157975) 0.0202102 
Health 
-0.3417024*** -0.3938565*** -0.4229169*** -0.7245214*** 
0.0202804 0.0153753 (0.0272783) 0.0268952 
Age -0.6054246*** 
0.1511379 
-0.3814767*** -0.7472762*** -0.649254*** 
0.1980303 0.1106464 (0.1884626) 
Age2 
0.1522419*** 0.1008702*** 0.1869221*** 0.1729274*** 
0.0422918 0.0265799 (0.0532503) 0.0479469 
Married 0.3001342*** 
0.0587513 
0.298259*** 0.7497929*** 0.5259276*** 
0.0771083 0.0424206 (0.1400172) 
Children 0.0634793*** 
0.0148166 
0.0252305** 0.0708687*** 0.044782** 
0.0200138 0.0109304 (0.0183725) 
Gender 0.0698762** 
0.032578 
0.1055287*** 0.0652152 0.1938793*** 









Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0371 7874 0.1119 0.2158 
Number Obs. 4821 0.0564 4821 7874 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional and housing dummies included but omitted from the Table. 














Table 11: Regressions for Wellbeing 2003 (Happiness) - differences between High-Income 
and Low-Income earners 
Method Ordered Probit OLS 
Individuals High-Income Low-Income High-Income Low-Income 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-- -- 9.23637*** 8.254977*** 
  (0.4489854) (0.6469352) 
Income 
0.0000645*** 0.000616*** 0.0000706*** 0.0012761*** 
0.0000159 0.0000795 (0.000019) (0.0001521) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.1905951 -0.4808955** -0.2462002 -0.4703156 
0.309707 0.2309623 (0.3645275) (0.5008158) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.2081445 -0.5108766** -0.3461647 -0.5432214 
0.3253696 0.226716 (0.3849695) (0.4940437) 
Hours Worked 
0.0023433 0.0010261 0.0025536 0.0016376 
0.0016229 0.0009959 (0.0019382) (0.0019042) 
Education 
-0.0472612* 0.1164895*** -0.0458441 0.235442*** 
0.0265393 0.0183443 (0.0313681) (0.0355814) 
Health 
-0.3588903*** -0.3460005*** -0.4143546*** -0.6571576*** 
0.0189809 0.0146213 (0.0220163) (0.0261736) 
Age -0.2934693*** 
0.1025129 
-0.1926082*** -0.3745665*** -0.3456678*** 
(0.1252738) 0.0654079 (0.121873) 
Age2 
0.0457528*** 0.0327819*** 0.0591792*** 0.0589908*** 
0.0170558 0.0101963 (0.0202666) (0.019591) 
Married 0.3761402*** 
0.0612621 
0.3334035*** 0.92045*** 0.7293897*** 
(0.0759624) 0.0451398 (0.1712325) 
Children 0.055296*** 
0.0172589 
0.0047346 0.0610156*** 0.0097042 
(0.0211193) 0.0109152 (0.0207616) 
Gender 0.0760193** 
0.0361744 
0.1007601*** 0.0874909** 0.1807097*** 









Pseudo R2/ R2 0.0533 0.0485 0.1552 0.1872 
Number Obs. 3809 7191 3809 7191 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional and housing dummies included but omitted from the Table. 
 
In 2003 almost all the results of 2007 are confirmed but in this case also Education is a worse 
predictor of wellbeing for the richest than for the poorest. The interesting conclusion 
according to which structural government expenditures affect more the wellbeing of the 
poorest than that of the richest remains also in 2003.  
4.4 Robustness tests for the introduction of more 
macroeconomic variables 
As previous literature also included other macroeconomic variables (e.g. Hessami, 2010) as 
determinants of happiness, we want to further test our result against the introduction of 
other macroeconomic variables. The most important macroeconomic variables to relate 
with happiness are GDP per capita (which in fact can be a substitute to the consideration of 
average income, which has been mentioned above in footnote 5) and inflation. Previous 
literature had found positive effects of GDP per capita and negative effects of inflation. 
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Table 12: Regressions for Wellbeing - additional Macroeconomic variables 
Method Ordered Probit 
Regression 2007 2003 2007 2003 
Income 
0.00000239 0.0000749*** 0.00000629** 0.0001064*** 
(0.00000184) (0.00000822) (0.00000275) (0.00000799) 
Unemployment_sr 
-0.3120506*** -0.3937637*** -0.2559043** -0.3609537*** 
(0.1129276) (0.1332108) (0.1236066) (0.135904) 
Unemployment_lr 
-0.4224314*** -0.5043331*** -0.3207786*** -0.4637384*** 
(0.1063461) (0.1312603) (0.1157673) (0.134872) 
Hours Worked 
-0.0011925 0.0012294* -0.0011128 -0.0000284 
(0.0008099) (0.0007038) (0.0008955) (0.0007989) 
Education 
0.0685659*** 0.0674656*** 0.0553646*** 0.0341773** 
(0.0066886) (0.0123183) (0.0075678) (0.0137542) 
Health 
-0.3823063*** -0.3451089*** -0.3967899*** -0.3674197*** 




-0.2637692*** -0.5286757*** -0.2680336*** 
(0.0499886) (0.0436538) (0.0851735) 
Age2 
0.1189439*** 0.0427534*** 0.1315341*** 0.0468708*** 




0.3531178*** 0.4123092*** 0.3292761*** 




0.0209074*** 0.0500548*** 0.0161096* 




0.1006638*** 0.0475442** 0.0895741*** 









GDP pc (in logs) 0.3328221*** 0.2635892*** -- -- 
(0.0215387) (0.0257493)   
Inflation -- -- -8.001669*** -1.541506*** 
  (0.6606764) (0.1672793) 
Pseudo R2/ R2 
 
0.0681 0.0714 0.0650 0.0670 
Number Obs. 17244 16364 12893 12771 
Notes Robust Standard deviation errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***(1%); 
**(5%); *(10%); for the other cases, the value is not statistic significant. Marital 
Status, professional and housing dummies included in regressions but omitted from 
the Table. 
 
In Table 12, we introduce GDP per capita and inflation each in a time due to possible 
collinearity between macroeconomic variables. In fact correlations between inflation and 
GDP per capita are 73% in 2007 and 63% in 2003. Also, correlations with structural 
government expenditures are also high (above 55%). Despite this potential multicollienarity 
effect, when testing all the three macroeconomic variables simultaneously, structural 
expenditures also affect negatively happiness in 2003 and both happiness and life 
satisfaction in 2003 and 2007.8 Also worth noting are the statistically significant effects of 
GDP per capita and inflation in line with previous references. 
 
                                                 





Contrary to the scarce existing evidence on the relationship between the government 
expenditure, welfare state and wellbeing, we obtained a robust negative effect of 
structural government expenditure in happiness and life satisfaction9. This relationship has 
been identified despite the usual individual determinants of wellbeing (such as income, 
health, age, children, education and so on) for data collected by the European Quality of 
Life Surveys in 2003 and 2007.  
The result is broadly maintained for substitutes of structural government expenditures, such 
as structural government debt and deficits (calculated for the excessive deficits procedure 
of the EU). We have not identified significant differences on this effect between the euro 
zone and the rest of European countries and between the richest and the poorest in Europe, 
we could identify a relatively stronger effect on the poorest.  
This finding seems to indicate that this long-run effect is not capturing the reasonable 
positive effect welfare counter-cyclical expenditures such as unemployment subsidies may 
have in the poorest and emphasizes that the effect highlighted in this work is a structural 
one, mostly linked with fear of future taxes or austerity measures. Our final robustness 
analysis also found negative effects of structural government expenditures on happiness and 
life satisfaction given the also significant effects of macroeconomic variables such as GDP 
per capita and inflation. 
These results are challenging as, contrary to some previous ones, indicate a negative and 
robust effect of long-run government imbalances on wellbeing which should decrease the 
incentives of politicians to increase the government size in order to appraise their electors. 
These results are also consistent with people valuing both present and future prospects of 
macroeconomic stability and fearing future measures of austerity. 
                                                 
9
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Table A.1: Definition and Sources Variables 
NAME ABREVIATION DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT SOURCES 









































































European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
AGE CATEGORY 
SQUARED 
agec2 Calculated using the squared age´s 
values. 
 
GENDER gen 1- Male 
2- Female 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
MARITAL STATUS mar1 1- Married or living with partner; 0 
otherwise 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
mar2 1- Separated or divorced and not living 
with partner; 0 otherwise 
mar3 1- Widowed and not living with 
partner; 0 otherwise 
mar4 1- Never married and not living with 
partner; 0 otherwise 
EDUCATION edu Education level for 2007– ISCED 
1- Isced 0 = pre-primary education 
2- Isced 1 = primary education 
3- Isced 2 = lower secondary education 
4- Isced 3 = upper secondary education 
5- Isced 4 = post-secondary non 
terciary education 
6- Isced 5 = first stage of tertiary 
education 
7- Isced 6 = second stage of tertiary 
education (advanced research 
qualification) 
Education level  for 2003– ISCED 
1 Primary education 
2 Secondary education 
3 University 
4 None 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
NR. CHILDRENS chil Number of childrens European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
TYPE OF 
HABITATION 
hou1 1- Own without mortgages European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
hou2 1- Own with mortgages 
hou3 1- Tenant, paying rent to private 
landlord 
hou4 1- Tenant, paying rent in 
social/voluntary/municipal housing 
hou5 1- Accommodation is provided rent 
free 
hou6 1- Other 
 37 
INCOME inc Household´s total net monthly income, in 
euro 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
UNEMPLOYMENT unemp12 
unempX 
Dummies for Unemployed less 12 m and for 
Unemployed 12 m or more 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
NR. HOURS WORKED hwk Number of hours work(ed) per week, 
including any paid or unpaid overtime 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
LIFE SATISFACTION lif Life Satisfaction Scale - all things considered, 
how satisfied would you say you are with your 
life: 
1-  1 (very dissatisfied) 
2-  2  
3-  3 
4-  4 
5-  5 
6-  6 
7-  7 
8-  8 
9-  9 
10- 10 (Very satisfied) 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
HAPPINESS hap Happiness Scale -  taking all things together, 
how happy would you say you are, using a 
scale: 
1-  1(Very unhappy) 
2-  2 
3-  3 
4-  4 
5-  5 
6-  6 
7-  7 
8-  8 
9-  9 
10- 10 (Very happy) 
European Quality of 
Life Surveys (EQLS) 
HEALTH hea In general, would you say your health is: 




5- Very bad 
European Quality of 
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Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter in EViews, 
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Structural Government Consumption 
=  
{
                      
         
} 
 
Average 2002 – 2007 for the 2007 data 
 
Average 1998 – 2003 for the 2003 data 
Penn World Table:  
Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina 
Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 7.1, Center for 
International 
Comparisons of 
Production, Income and 
Prices at the University 
of Pennsylvania, Nov 
2012.  
Variables:  
 POP – 
Population, in 
thousands 










Share of PPP 
Converted GDP 
Per capita at 
2005 constant 
prices [rgdpl] 
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Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter in EViews, 
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Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter in EViews, 
transformed Government Consumption in 
Government Consumption Trend and Cycle 
 
Structural Government Consumption with 
trended Government Consumption 
=  
{
                            
         
} 
 
Average 2002 – 2007 for the 2007 data 
 
Average 1998 – 2003 for the 2003 data 
Penn World Table:  
Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina 
Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 7.1, Center for 
International 
Comparisons of 
Production, Income and 
Prices at the University 
of Pennsylvania, Nov 
2012.  
Variables:  
 POP – 
Population, in 
thousands 






 kg - 
Government 
Consumption 
Share of PPP 
Converted GDP 
Per capita at 
2005 constant 
prices [rgdpl] 






of c, g, i, at 
2005 constant 
prices 
DEFICIT def Average 2003 – 2007 for the 2007 data. 
 
There is no data available for the 2003 data. 
Eurostat: AMECO – 




for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN): 
Variable: 
Structural balance of 
general government: 




procedure  (UBLGAPS) 
DEBT gdebt Average 2002 – 2007 for the 2007 data. 
 
Average 1998 – 2003 for the 2003 data. 
Eurostat: AMECO– 




for Economic and 





debt: Excessive deficit 
procedure (based on 
ESA 1995) (UDGG) 
 
 
